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Social media platforms have been exploited to conduct election interference in recent years. In particular,
the Russian-backed Internet Research Agency (IRA) has been identified as a key source of misinformation
spread on Twitter prior to the 2016 presidential election. The goal of this research is to understand whether
general Twitter users changed their behavior in the year following first contact from an IRA account. We
compare the before and after behavior of contacted users to determine whether there were differences in
their mean tweet count, the sentiment of their tweets, and the frequency and sentiment of tweets mentioning
@realDonaldTrump or@HillaryClinton. Our results indicate that users overall exhibited statistically significant
changes in behavior across most of these metrics, and that those users that engaged with the IRA generally
showed greater changes in behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
For many years, the growth of online social media has been seen as a tool used to bring people
together across borders and time-zones. However, malicious actors have been shown to have
harnessed the tool of social media to instead test their hand at sowing regional discord [5, 40].
Prior to the 2016 presidential election, the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Russian organization,
created a âĂĲtroll farmâĂİ, which registered and deployed thousands of sham accounts across
various social media platforms [27]. These IRA accounts have been shown to have both targeted
U.S. citizens and worked towards goals of forging interference in American politics, specifically the
2016 presidential election involving primary candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump [27].
Their operations were deeply sophisticated and mainly aimed at instigating the social media users
against each other on socio-economic grounds, political sentiments, and voting perceptions [18].
The IRA deployed 3,841 fake accounts on Twitter, a micro-blogging site, which resulted in 1.4
million Twitter users being exposed to the IRA tweets, as reported by Twitter [29], which led
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to roughly 73 million total engagements [38]. The main goal of this research is to understand to
what extent the behavior of Twitter users changed after contact by IRA bots during or prior to the
2016 U.S. presidential election cycle. The implications are clearly enormous as a new presidential
election of 2020 looms, which may be disrupted by the continuing efforts of the IRA [11] or other
like-minded organizations. This work focuses on an extensive before and after analysis of Twitter
users’ behavior based on six quantifiable metrics to identify the extent of changes following initial
IRA contact.
While prior work has studied in great detail the behavior of the IRA bot accounts and tech-
niques that they employed to spread misinformation [8, 9, 19, 22], based on a data set released
by Twitter [29], much less work has examined the targets of the IRA bots, namely the overall
Twitter user population. One recent work [4] examining such targets surveyed the attitudes and
behaviors of 1,239 Republican and Democratic Twitter users and found no evidence that Russian
agents successfully changed user opinions or voting decisions. However, a limitation of this study
is that it focused on a subset of Twitter users who already held fairly strong partisan beliefs and as
a result may not be easily swayed by IRA bots.
Our interest is to study a broader population consisting of all the Twitter users contacted by the
IRA to understand if their behavior changed before and after contact. This broader population of
users may be less partisan in nature and hence more amenable to influence. Specifically, this study
focuses on the following research questions:
• RQ1: Did the contacted Twitter users exhibit a change in behavior following contact with
IRA accounts?
• RQ2: Did the contacted Twitter users who engaged back with the IRA accounts behave
differently compared with those who did not after the contact?
• RQ3: Did the behavior of users with high follower count ("influencers") differ from those
with low follower count ("general users") after initial contact with the IRA?
To answer these questions, we have collected tweets of Twitter users whom the IRA bots contacted
through retweets, replies, and mentions. To identify whether there were significant changes in
the tweeting behavior before and after their interaction with the IRA, and if so by how much,
we selected objective behavioral metrics that measured monthly tweet count, mean sentiment of
tweets, frequency of mentioning either @realDonaldTrump or @HillaryClinton, and the mean
sentiment of tweets that tag either @realDonaldTrump or @Hillary Clinton.
In addition, our research considers whether the behavior of those contacted Twitter users with a
high follower count (дe5000), whom we term "influencers", differed from the behavior of contacted
users with a more typical follower count (<5000), whom we term "general users". Combined with
our interest in studying users who responded to and did not respond to the contact attempts by
the IRA, this creates four groups of users that we studied: responsive influencers, non-responsive
influencers, responsive general users, and non-responsive general users.
We further desired to restrict the data set to American Twitter users due to our interest in the
2016 presidential election, but lacked geo-location or other information to determine whether a
Twitter user is American. Our closest approximation was to filter the data set for English language
tweets, as the IRA bots also conversed with users using other languages, especially Russian. In
addition, the user pool was filtered in order to remove potential bots, protected accounts, and
accounts with insufficient data to be studied. We also focused our efforts on studying those users
who were most targeted by the IRA, namely those who had been contacted in all three ways through
retweets, replies, and mentions by the IRA. We reasoned that if this group could first be shown to
exhibit a change in behavior, then it would justify expanding our data collection to the much larger
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Fig. 1. The process we used to create and analyze the Twitter dataset. The final user population has been
divided into four subsets: responsive and unresponsive general users, as well as responsive and unresponsive
influencers. All users in this work were filtered to remove those with bot-like behavior, protected accounts,
predominantly non-English tweets, or insufficient data to be studied. Before and after analysis was performed
to evaluate monthly tweet volumes, overall sentiment, as well as the frequencies and sentiment of tweets
mentioning either @realDonaldTrump or @HillaryClinton.
set of those users who had been contacted in at least one of the three ways. Figure 1 illustrates the
overall process of data pre-processing and the before and after analysis.
With these caveats in mind, this work provides some of the first evidence that contacted Twitter
users’ behavior underwent significant changes in a variety of ways following interactions with
Russia’s Internet Research Agency prior to the 2016 presidential election. Specifically, this paper
makes the following contributions:
• A substantially broader population of Twitter users is studied to understand whether user
behavior changed before and after contact by the IRA accounts.
• Evidence is found of statistically significant increases in tweeting frequency across all user
groups, including responsive and non-responsive general users and influencers, after initial
contact by the IRA. (RQ1)
• Three of the four user groups exhibited statistically significant decreases in sentiment (i.e.,
less positive or more negative) after initial contact by the IRA. (RQ1)
• The frequency of monthly mentions of @realDonaldTrump is shown to significantly increase
for all user groups after initial contact by the IRA. (RQ1)
• Statistically significant increases in monthly mentions of @HillaryClinton occurred for all
four user groups after initial contact by the IRA. (RQ1)
• Across a variety of different metrics, responsive users who engaged with the IRA generally
showed change that was either higher in percentage or satisfied stricter statistical significance
compared with non-responsive users. (RQ2)
• We found no statistically significant difference in the behavior of influencers versus general
users. (RQ3)
The intent of this paper is to identify and quantify correlation between initial contact by the IRA
and changed behavior by targeted users where it exists. The intent of the paper is not to establish
causality, i.e., that IRA contact caused the changes in behavior, which would require a different
path of research. The Discussion section of the paper describes this topic in more detail.
In the following, we first describe background and related work, then explain our data collection
and pre-processing filters, followed by a description of our method for performing before and after
analysis, including the metrics used. We then present the key results of our data analysis. The paper
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finishes with a discussion of the implications and limitations of our work as well as a summary of
our conclusions.
BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
Internet Research Agency
Internet Research Agency (IRA) is a well-known Russian company engaged in online influence
operations on behalf of Russian business and political interests [8, 14, 23, 31]. According to the
Mueller Report released in 2017 [26], the IRA was using social media to undermine the electoral
process and is at the center of the federal indictment. They have been collecting sensitive informa-
tion, such as names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, and other valuable data about
thousands of Americans. The IRA campaign during the 2016 election has drawn great interest in
the research community. Earlier research has characterized the strategies of IRA activity on social
media from various perspectives [8, 9, 19, 22]. To the best of our knowledge, most of this work
does not examine how IRA accounts interact with general Twitter users, and whether or not these
campaigns play a role in changing attitudes and behaviors of such users. Bail et al. [4] used survey
data that described the attitudes and behaviors of 1,239 Republican and Democratic Twitter users
and found no evidence that these Russian agents successfully changed user opinions or voting
decisions. In comparison, we have expanded the scope of our study to consider a much broader
population of users over a longer observational period, and found significant differences in their
behaviors before and after the contact.
Malicious Bots on Social Media
While some bots are designed for providing better service/management, such as auto-moderators
and chat bots, they can be misused for bad behavior by extreme groups [7]. For instance, researchers
have detected bots that spread misinformation [16, 32], interfere with elections [15], and amplify
hate against minority groups [2]. ISIS propagandists are also known for using bots to inflate their
influence and promote extreme ideologies [6]. Due to bots’ sophisticated behavior, it is increasingly
important to understand them and investigate strategies to combat malicious bots in an online
environment.
Social Media Manipulation during Elections
There is growing interest in understanding manipulation campaigns deployed on social media sites
specifically targeting elections. Other than the IRA campaign that we have mentioned previously,
similar approaches have been replicated by different countries. For example, during the 2016 UK
Brexit referendum it was found that political bots played a small but strategic role in shaping
Twitter conversations [20]. Ferrara [15] studied the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign during
the 2017 French presidential election and found that most users who engaged in this campaign
were foreigners with preexisting interest in alt-right topics and alternative news media. Arnaudo
[3] examined computational propaganda during three election related political events in Brazil
from 2014 to 2016, and found that social media manipulation was becoming more diverse and at a
much larger scale. Starbird et al. conducted an interpretative analysis of a cross-platform campaign
targeting a rescue group in Syria, which conceptualized what a disinformation campaign is and
how it works [36, 39].
DATA COLLECTION
The goal of this research is to understand behavioral changes of general American Twitter users
after interactions with the IRA. To achieve this goal, IRA tweets were analyzed to find a sample
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of user population the IRAs interacted with on Twitter. To keep the scope of this work focused
on the most heavily targeted users, only those users who were mentioned, replied to, as well as
retweeted by the IRAs were considered for the analysis. The reason for this selection is that these
users are potentially the ones most impacted by IRA interactions. To isolate American users who
were contacted, the pool of potential users was put through a number of vetting processes in order
to weed out users who did not have majority of their tweets published in English. The screening
also removed users with protected accounts, users who had a high probability of being a Twitter
bot account, and users whose first accessible tweet occurred after IRA contact. This process has
been illustrated in Figure 1.
IRA Data Set: This study used an unhashed version of the data set made public by Twitter
for research purposes [29]. The IRA accounts were confirmed to be Russian agents by the U.S.
government during the 2017 investigation into the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle [27]. The data
set contains the tweets of 3,479 IRA accounts, that are assumed to be connected to the propaganda
efforts of the Internet Research Agency and are currently suspended [29].
Contacted User Data Set: Twitter has identified 1.4 million users who interacted with the IRA
via Twitter [29]. However, in order to preserve the anonymity of these users, that data set has
not been released to the public. Therefore, to study the users who interacted with the IRA, our
research first analyzed a total of 8,768,633 tweets shared by the 3,479 IRA accounts, from May
2009 to June 2018, and identified users who were either replied to, retweeted by, or mentioned
by an IRA account. 6% of the IRA tweets were in reply to other users, resulting in 82,806 distinct
users contacted by the IRAs. Out of these users, 1,533 ( 2%) were identified as themselves being
affiliated with the IRA. 38% of the IRA tweets were retweets of other Twitter users, resulting in
204,273 distinct users who were retweeted by IRA accounts, out of which 1,819 ( 1% of them) were
identified as themselves being affiliated with the IRA. 46% of the IRA tweets mentioned other users,
resulting in 829,080 distinct users who were mentioned by the IRA accounts. Among these users,
2,141 ( 0.3%) were identified as themselves being affiliated with the IRA.
In aggregate, we found 837,688 non-IRA Twitter users who received either mentions, replies, or
retweets from an IRA account. The set of highly targeted users that were contacted by all three
methods (mention, reply, retweet) consists of 15,929 users, and is the focus of this study. We plan
to extend this study in the future to consider the wider set of 837,688 users contacted by at least
one of the three means.
General Users vs. Influencers:We separated the set of users identified above into two groups,
influencers and general users, to better understand the IRA impact. We consider influencers to be
those users who have at least 5,000 followers. We used Tweepy, a python library for the Twitter
API [30], to calculate each user’s follower count. Tweepy was unable to access information on 2,873
protected, deleted, or similarly inaccessible Twitter users. We found that of the remaining 13,056
accounts, there were 6,565 general users and 6,491 influencers.
For these 13,056 users we utilized Twint, a Twitter-scraping python library, to collect their user
data [37]. Twint has less severe rate restrictions than Twitter and specializes in excavating archival
data specifically [37]. Twint can compile all tweets publicly authored by a user but it is restricted in
the retweet and favorite tweets that it can scrape. Twint can only retrieve the most recent retweets
and the most recently favorite tweets [37]. When working with data from previous years, it is
unlikely that a majority of favorite tweets from said period will be reachable. For this reason,
retweets and favorite tweets were not utilized within this analysis, as their presence could be
unevenly distributed due to this time-sensitive constraint.
Twint is also limited in the state of the accounts it is able to retrieve. Twint is unable to retrieve
account data for deleted accounts [37]. Additionally, Twint is unable to scrape tweets published
while a Twitter account was “protected” (private), even if the account is later made public [37].
Proc. ACM Hum.-Comput. Interact., Vol. TBD, No. CSCW, Article TBD. Publication date: November 2020.
TBD:6 Dutta and Hansom et al.
Users “shadow-banned” from Twitter were also inaccessible via Twint [37]; “Shadow-banning” is a
process wherein a user’s data is not available through the Twitter search feature for a period of
time [17, 35].
Responsive vs. Unresponsive Users: After removing the deleted and inaccessible accounts
within the general user set, 5,001 users’ tweet histories were scraped. Analysis of these tweets
revealed that 2,285 of the users in this set ( 45.6%) engaged back with the IRA by either mentioning
an IRA account in their tweets or by replying to the tweets shared by an IRA agent, while the
remaining 54.4% of users showed no signs of engagement through mentions with an IRA account.
Within the influencer user set, 5,712 users’ tweet histories could be obtained. Analysis of the tweets
of this influencer set revealed that 1,054 of them ( 18.5%) engaged back with IRA accounts by either
mentioning the IRAs in their tweets or by replying to the tweets shared by the IRA, while the
remaining 81.5% of users showed no signs of engaging back with an IRA account.
Removal of Potential Bots: In order to ensure the users under the purview of this study were
legitimate users, a number of filters were utilized to remove accounts suspected of deviating from
this criteria. A python API, Botometer, was used to assess the likelihood that any individual user
was an automated account and not a natural user [41]. A “universal” and an “English” score are
returned by Botometer for each user, representing the probability that an account is run by a bot
[41]. The “English” score checks only English-specific information, while the “universal” score is
not language specific [41]. Accounts that received probabilities of 0.4 or greater from Botometer
were deemed suspected bots and thus removed from this analysis. 151 of the 5,001 users within
this general user set were removed by the Botometer general, whereas 182 of the 5,712 users were
removed from the influencer set .
Language Analysis: Next, a language analysis was performed using a language-detection
Python library called langdetect [13]. It was found that the majority of the tweets examined were
published in either English or Russian. For users who engaged back with an IRA account, the
number of tweets published in Russian were more numerous than those written in English, whereas
for people who did not engage back, English tweets outnumbered Russian. As for the influencer set,
the number of English tweets outnumbered the number of tweets in any other languages for the
set of users who engaged back as well as for those who did not. Only those users who had more
than 75% of their total tweets in English were selected to remain in the study.
Removal of Insufficient Data:Additionally, users whose first date of contact by an IRA account
was prior to their first recorded tweet on file were removed (i.e., the IRA contact occurred before
the account was made public), leaving a total of 1,839 users remaining in the general user set, 578
of whom engaged back with an IRA account while the remaining 1,261 did not. These users formed
the final responsive general and unresponsive general user sets, on which before and after analysis
was performed. Of the influential users with 5,000 or greater follower counts, 3,056 users remained,
430 of whom engaged back with an IRA account and 2,626 did not. These two groups formed the
responsive influencer and unresponsive influencer user groups respectively. Table 1 shows the
number of tweets analysed in each category of users to conduct the before and the after analysis.
Table 1. Size of the data-set used for the before-and-after analysis
Category of users Total count of users Behavior No. of users No. of tweets
General 1,839
Engaged back 578 (31.4%) 19,548,890
Did not engage back 1,261 (68.6%) 33,960,883
Influencers 3,056
Engaged back 430 (14.07%) 29,246,645
Did not engage back 2,626 (85.95%) 148,780,230
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METHOD
A before and after analysis was performed on the users contacted by IRA accounts. As each user
was contacted on a potentially different date, time ‘zero’ for each user in the study was assigned as
the date of first IRA contact of that user, thus allowing us to aggregate before and after behaviors
across different users contacted at different times. To analyze the before IRA contact behavior, we
considered for each user the 12-month time period preceding their time zero event, and similarly,
to analyze the after IRA contact behavior, we considered for each user the 12-month time period
following their time zero event. For each monthly score, a period of 31 days was used in place of a
calendar month.
The before and after analysis monitored user behavior through six specific metrics: monthly user
tweet count, monthly user average sentiment, number of monthly @realDonaldTrump mentions,
number of monthly @HillaryClinton mentions, monthly average sentiment of tweets mentioning
@realDonaldTrump and monthly average sentiment of tweets mentioning @HillaryClinton.
Monthly Tweet Count was determined for each user by assessing the total number of tweets
published by a user within the bounds of a one-month period. This count includes tweets published
by the Twitter user and replies to other Twitter accounts during that time period. We excluded
favorite tweets, retweets of tweets authored by another Twitter account, or other Twitter activity
from the monthly tweet count because of the limitations mentioned in the Data Collection Section.
VADER Sentiment Analysis, a python sentiment analysis tool built specifically to examine text
written on social media, was used to return a sentiment score on the range [-1, 1] for each tweet
authored by a given user within an allotted time span [21]. A sentiment score of -1 indicates a
highly negative sentiment while a score of 1 indicates a highly positive sentiment. These values
were then averaged to form the Monthly Sentiment score for each user.
A Trump or Hillary mention is defined within this study as a tweet which directly tags either
@realDonaldTrump or @HillaryClinton, respectively. These counts include tweets from users writ-
ten in response to either @realDonaldTrump or @HillaryClinton. The sum of @realDonaldTrump
and @HillaryClinton mentions over the assigned time period form the Trump Mention Count and
Hillary Mention Count.
In order to examine the intersection of Trump or Hillary mentions and user sentiment, we used
the VADER Sentiment Analysis on the tweets directed at @realDonaldTrump and @HillaryClinton.
The results form the Trump Mention Sentiment and Hillary Mention Sentiment scores.
To assess the statistical significance of results from the before and after analysis of user tweeting
behaviors, the Wilcoxon hypothesis test was used [34], which is a non-parametric alternative to the
dependent samples t-test. We use this alternative because the distribution of our sample data does
not approximate a normal distribution. Also, since the before and after samples are not independent
of each other, the Mann-Whitney U-test cannot be used. The assumptions of the Wilcoxon tests are
(a) the samples compared are paired, (b) each pair is chosen randomly and independently, and (c)
the data are measured on at least an interval scale when within-pair differences are calculated to
perform the test. The samples we use to perform the Wilcoxon hypothesis tests satisfy all these
three assumptions. Since not all users may have 12 months of activity on Twitter before they were
first contacted by the IRA, for the hypothesis tests we consider only a subset of users who were
active on Twitter for at least 6 months prior to their interaction with the IRAs. This also removes
the users who were very new to the platform. All the hypothesis tests were done at a 0.05 level of
significance.
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Fig. 2. Total monthly tweet volumes have changed in a statistically significant way after first contact in
both responsive and unresponsive general user groups. Both subsets had local maximum tweet counts in the
month following IRA contact.
Fig. 3. Total monthly tweet volumes have increased in a statistically significant manner after first contact in
both responsive and unresponsive influencer groups. Only responsive influencers are shown to have had a
local maximum tweet count occur in the month directly following initial IRA engagement.
RESULTS
User Behavior
A before and after analysis was performed on the behavior of Twitter users contacted by IRA
accounts. Using the prior definitions of general users and influencers, as well as responsive and
non-responsive users, four groups were analyzed, namely responsive general users, unresponsive
general users, responsive influencers, unresponsive influencers. Plots have behavior for the year
prior to and following IRA contact displayed, whereas significance testing, means, medians and
other descriptive data are determined using only six months before and after IRA contact.
Monthly Tweet Frequency: Users across all groups were found to have significantly changed
tweeting frequency in the months following initial IRA contact (See Figure 2 and Figure 3). Responsive
general users had an average increase in tweet volume of 26.02% following first IRA contact and
unresponsive general users had an average increase in tweet volume of 15.43%. Influencers saw an
average increase of 15.96% for responsive users and 9.83% for unresponsive users. Within both the
responsive and unresponsive general users as well as the responsive influencers, a local maximum is
seen as having occurred in the month following first IRA contact, however this trend is not followed
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Fig. 4. Average monthly sentiment significantly changed only for general users which responded back to an
IRA accounts. Users who chose not to engage back with IRA accounts did not show significant change at the
0.05 level of significance in sentiment in the months following contact.
Fig. 5. Average monthly sentiment significantly changed for both influencer user groups, responsive and
unresponsive.
in the the unresponsive influencer subset. It is shown here that the responsive users within both
the general and influencer sets have clearly sustained higher mean tweets in the year following IRA
interaction. While the unresponsive general users also show a peak during the month following
IRA interaction, their tweet counts descend to reflect counts similar to those found before IRA
contact.
Monthly Tweet Sentiment: Overall mean tweet sentiment by month was shown to increase in
negativity in a statistically significant manner for responsive general users, and both responsive and
unresponsive influencers (See Figure 4 and Figure 5). However, the unresponsive general users
showed no significant change at the 0.05 level of significance. For responsive general users, mean
sentiment prior to IRA contact rested at 0.023 and fell to 0.015 after, whereas unresponsive general
users had a mean sentiment of 0.049 before IRA contact and 0.05 after. For influencers, mean
sentiment for responsive users was 0.022 before contact and 0.019 after, while for the unresponsive
ones the mean sentiment was 0.092 before IRA contact and 0.088 after. Responsive general users
became notably more negative in sentiment after IRA contact, while responsive influencers tended
to be more negative in general than their unresponsive counterparts.
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Fig. 6. The monthly @realDonaldTrump mention counts for the general users groups, those which responded
to an IRA account and those which did not.
Fig. 7. Themonthly@realDonaldTrumpmention counts for the influencer user groups, those which responded
to an IRA account and those which did not. The responsive influencer accounts mentioned@realDonaldTrump
more regularly than any other group.
@realDonaldTrump Mentions: The number of monthly mentions of the @realDonaldTrump
account significantly increased for all user segments (See Figure 6 and Figure 7). For general users,
mentioning of the @realDonaldTrump handle increased by 65.51% for responsive users and by
27.93% for unresponsive users. Among influencers, @realDonaldTrumpwas mentioned 94.72%more
after IRA contact by responsive users and 145.82% more by unresponsive users. In the responsive
users groups, general and influencer, the number of @realDonaldTrump mentions dwarfs the
unresponsive user groups in their respective categories. Responsive influencers were found to have
tagged @realDonaldTrump more regularly than any other user set.
Looking at the intersection of user sentiment and @realDonaldTrump mentions, a significant
change was observed only within the unresponsive influencer set (See Figure 8 and Figure 9).
While responsive general users are seen to become increasingly negative in the subsequent months
following IRA contact (going from a mean sentiment of 0.002 before and -0.015 after IRA contact),
this was not found to be statistically significant. A random analysis of this tweet set indicated
that while tweet sentiment did grow more negative, the negativity was most often targeting the
opponents of @realDonaldTrump, often stemming from tweets replying to @realDonaldTrump
himself. Some examples of this phenomenon are: "@readDonaldTrump We know Obama had
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Fig. 8. No significant change was detected in the sentiment of @realDonaldTrump tweets by contacted users
for either the responsive or unresponsive general users, despite the dip into an overall negative sentiment
seen in responsive general users.
Fig. 9. Sentiment of @realDonalTrump tweets by contacted influencers was shown to have significantly
changed only for unresponsive influencers. For responsive influencers, no significant change was detected.
Trump Tower wire tapped no doubt at all keep tweeting", "@foxnews [...] @realDonaldTrump It’s
not bigotry to keep terrorists out of this country." and "@nytimes @realDonaldTrump [...] Everyone
knows media & NYT is dishonest. That is why you are popular, you tell them to their face." (some
identifying usernames have been redacted from these examples). It appeared that the sentiment
change in @realDonaldTrump tweets may have indicated a growing desire to engage Trump’s
perceived adversaries than an increasingly negative sentiment for Trump himself. Unresponsive
general users sentiment decreased from 0.015 before IRA contact to 0.009 after. The decline into
negative sentiment of @realDonaldTrump mentions seen in the unresponsive general user group is
not seen within the influencer subset. Unresponsive influencers appeared to conversely grow more
positive in their tweets regarding @realDonaldTrump, with a before mean sentiment of 0.019 and
an after sentiment of 0.029. Responsive influencers had a mean sentiment of @realDonaldTrump
mentions of 0.031 before IRA contact and 0.013 after.
@HillaryClintonMentions: There is a statistically significant increase in the number of monthly
mentions of @HillaryClinton within all user groups (See Figure 10 and Figure 11). For general
users, responsive users mentioned @HillaryClinton with 55.44% more regularity after IRA contact,
and unresponsive users mentioned the handle 14.75% more often. For influencers, there was an
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Fig. 10. The change in monthly @HillaryClinton mention counts are significant among each of the general
user groups, responsive and unresponsive.
Fig. 11. The change in monthly @HillaryClinton mention counts are significant among each of the influencer
subsets, those which responded to an IRA account and those which did not.
increase of 101.62% and 67.4% in @HillaryClinton mentions for responsive and unresponsive users,
respectively. While all groups showed increased mentions of @HillaryClinton, responsive users
from each the general and influencer set clearly sustained a larger number of mentions in the year
after first IRA contact, following the pattern that @realDonaldTrump mention counts exhibited to
a far lesser degree. Again responsive influencers are found to have mentioned @HillaryClinton
more than any other user group, though their use of the @realDonaldTrump handle triples their
use of @HillaryClinton for most months.
There is a statistically significant increase in negativity of user sentiment for the @HillaryClinton
mentions only within the unresponsive general users and the responsive influencers (See Figure
12 and Figure 13). Responsive general users have a mean sentiment of @HillaryClinton mentions
of -0.017 before IRA contact and -0.021 after. Unresponsive general users have a before mean of
0.002 and an after mean of -0.001. Influencers mean sentiment changes from -0.003 to -0.025 for
responsive users and 0.018 to 0.017 for unresponsive users. Possibly too few data points exist
to show significant change within this set, as @HillaryClinton was not mentioned as often as
@realDonaldTrump.
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Fig. 12. Sentiment has significantly changed only for unresponsive general users mentioning @HillaryClinton.
There was no significant change for responsive general users.
Fig. 13. Sentiment has significantly changed for responsive influencers mentioning @HillaryClinton. There
is no significant change for unresponsive influencers.
IRA to User Contact Points
The following data has been presented in order to contextualize the strategies and the timeline of
events surrounding IRA’s misinformation campaign (Figure 14 and Figure 15)
The IRA accounts listed within the data were created as early as 2009, though the majority of
accounts were registered with Twitter in 2014. Accounts continued to be created through 2016.
Examination of the distribution of first contact dates, i.e., the date upon which a user was first
mentioned by an IRA account, showed that while 2014 saw the first large wave of users being
contacted by IRA accounts, the most extensive campaign to reach Twitter users initiated contact
within 2015. Activity in 2016 decreased to mirror the number of users in 2014, before further
dropping off to the final year of actively reaching new Twitter users in 2017 (See Figure 14 and
Figure 15).
The mean number of contact points from an IRA account to a user is highly skewed due to the
number of contact points with a relatively small number of accounts, such as @realDonaldTrump.
As a result, the median number of contacts for each group has been used to show a more balanced
depiction of events. Across all users the median number of contact points is nine. Among the general
users, responsive users have a median of contact frequency of seven, while unresponsive users
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Fig. 14. The number of IRA outreach to general Twitter users increases until the spike in users reaches a
maximum in 2015, the year proceeding the 2016 Presidential election. After the diminished activity in 2017 no
further users were contacted by the IRA accounts housed within the data set of this study.
Fig. 15. The majority of influencer accounts were contacted by the IRA first in 2015, and no further initial
contacts were found after 2017. Far fewer influencer accounts were reached within years prior to 2014.
have a median of five. Within the influencers, responsive users have a median contact frequency of
fourteen and unresponsive users have a median of twenty.
The average time span from the first to the last contact with an IRA account across all users, is
503.67 days, well over an entire year. Within the general user group we see that the mean span
of contact is 355.23 days (449.08 mean for responsive general users and 276.12 for unresponsive
general users). For influencers, the average span of contact is 636.32 days (629.23 day mean for
responsive influencers and 642.85 day mean for unresponsive users).
Summary of ResearchQuestions
RQ1: Did the contacted Twitter users exhibit a change in behavior following contact with IRA
accounts? For all user groups, responsive and unresponsive general users and influencers, mean
tweet count significantly increased after IRA contact, as did the number of mentions of @realDon-
aldTrump and @HillaryClinton. There was also a significant increase in negative sentiment for
influencers as well as responsive general users.
RQ2: Did the contacted Twitter users who engaged back with the IRA accounts behave differently
compared with those who did not after the contact? For certain behavioral metrics the study
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observed a higher percentage change in users who engaged back with the IRAs compared with
those who did not, in both the general and the influencer user categories. The percentage change
of tweet counts was higher in responsive users than the unresponsive ones (26.02% and 15.43%
respectively among general users and 15.96% and 9.83% among the influencers). In addition, we
found that even though the general responsive users as well as both the category of users in the
influencer set show statistically significant change in overall tweet sentiments at 0.05 level of
significance, at 0.01 level of significance only the general users who engaged back with the IRAs
show a statistically significant change, while the other user sets do not, indicating that the change
in sentiments was the most prominent for the general users who engaged back.
Our findings also show that the general and the influencer users who responded back have a
greater percentage change in mentioning @HillaryClinton in their tweets, compared with those
who did not respond to the IRA accounts (55.44% and 14.75% respectively among general users
and 101.62% and 67.4% among the influencers). Among the general users, the percentage change
in mentioning @realDonaldTrump for users who responded back was greater (65.51%) compared
with the unresponsive ones (27.93%). In contrast, among the influencers, the users who did not
engage back showed a greater percentage change (145.82%) compared with those who did (94.72%).
RQ3: Did the behavior of users with high follower count ("influencers") differ from those with
low follower count ("general users") after initial contact with the IRA? We found that influencers
and general users did not exhibit sufficiently large differences in behavior according to the metrics
of this study. Both influencers and general users had similar behavioral changes in all groups for
overall tweet count andmention frequency of the@realDonaldTrump and@HillaryClinton handles.
All groups, except for unresponsive general users, also saw a significant change in overall sentiment.
No clear distinction can be made between general users and influencers for @realDonaldTrump or
@HillaryClinton sentiment. Deeper analysis of the percentage change in each behavior reveals that
while tweet count increased with greater frequency among general users, influencers increased
their uses of the @realDonaldTrump and @HillaryClinton handles more than that of the general
user population. For all three sentiment measures, no single set of influencers or general users had
a clearly more extreme change across both responsive and unresponsive users than the other.
DISCUSSION
Implications
As it has been shown that Russia and other foreign actors have continued their efforts to sow discord
around elections worldwide [1, 11, 25], it has become more important than ever to understand
the trends in behavior of users targeted in Russia’s efforts. It is the hope of this work that social
media platforms and governments around the globe will be spurred by the findings in this work
to cooperate to implement stronger policies that protect elections from online meddling. Given
the important real-world impact of this work, our hope is also that greater collaboration between
industry and academia will be stimulated.
Another potential implication of this work is that it may encourage more research investigating
the effect of nefarious online political activities on targeted user populations. This would include
studying whether users on other platforms besides Twitter, such as Facebook and Instagram,
exhibited similar before/after changes in behavior. Indeed, there is evidence that the spread of
misinformation is not confined solely to Twitter [10, 12, 24, 28]. This would also include investigating
which techniques achieved the greatest impact in terms of changing user behavior. Further, while
this work focused on users who were contacted by IRA accounts through mentions, retweets,
and replies, i.e., the intersection of these three mechanisms, the findings may motivate further
investigation of larger data sets such as the union of these three sets, which contains a much larger
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number of users (837,688). Given our promising initial results, we intend to explore this wider data
set in the future.
While our work has focused on ‘first order’ contacts between the IRA and Twitter users, this work
may also raise the question of whether impacted users also impacted their friends and followers
through their retweets, replies and mentions. Thus, we encourage investigators to study the impact
of ‘second order’ contacts.
Limitations
We have been careful not to claim cause and effect in this research. That is, while we observe
significant changes in behavior before and after contact by the IRA, we cannot definitively attribute
the correlation in these changes to being primarily or even exclusively caused by contact from
the IRA. There may be other factors that caused these changes. For example, tweet counts may
have risen generally throughout the time frame considered, and sentiment may have become more
negative generally and mentions of @realDonaldTrump and @HillaryClinton increased.
Establishing causality would require a different path of research, which is not the focus of this
work. If we wanted to pursue this path, then we could start by seeking to rule out other potential
causes. We would need to collect a baseline set of random Twitter users who had accounts during
2013-2017. Given the distribution of initial contacts from Figure 14 and Figure 15, we could randomly
select a user from the baseline for each initial contact date and study their behavior before/after
this date. Since most random users would also likely not have mentioned @realDonaldTrump or
@HillaryClinton, we could restrict our study to only those users who have mentioned them. This
would allow us to measure tweet count, mean sentiment, and political mentions. If the behavioral
changes are similar to ours, then we cannot rule out that there were general trends that may have
caused these changes, but if the baseline changes are different, then that rules out those general
trends as a cause, but still does not establish causality for the IRA. We also note that even though it
may be found that there are general trends among Twitter users, our study is still robust as it found
cases where (for example, the overall change of sentiments in tweets for general users) there was a
statistically significant change in users who engaged back with the IRAs, whereas no statistically
significant change in users who did not engage back. This difference is an indication that the trends
observed in this study are not merely the general trends observed on Twitter.
A limitation of this study was the inability to access several sources of archival Twitter data
including both user retweets and favorites, on either Twint or Tweepy, which could not be accessed
during the 2014-2017 time period for the majority of the users in the study [30, 37]. Although
engaging back with the IRAs via mentions and replies can perhaps be deemed as a stronger sign of
involvement with the IRAs, as compared to retweets, a log of favorite tweets as well as retweets
would have allowed for a much more all-encompassing view of user behavior on the platform.
Another limitation of this study was the inability to scientifically ascertain whether the users
are Americans or not. Twitter does not allow the extraction of location information if users do
not want their locations to be public. Since most of the Twitter users do not turn on their location
service settings, and even fewer of them go on to actually geo-tag their tweets [33], the analysis
would have ended up with very few tweets having location data associated if the study had relied
on tweets’ location information to discern if the user is American or not. Therefore, this study
focused only on users who had more than 75% of their tweets in English. It is unclear what fraction
of these English language posters are necessarily American.
It is also difficult to ascertain user attitudes, as it does not directly correlate with sentiments,
especially when working with small amounts of text, such as tweets. Although tweets mentioning
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@realDonaldTrump or @HillaryClinton were almost certainly pertaining to the respective candi-
dates in some capacity, it was unclear whether the sentiment was directed at the individuals, their
detractors, or some other third party.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the behavior of Twitter users before and after being contacted by
Russia’s Internet Research Agency prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Our key finding was
that for all user groups of highly targeted users—namely responsive and unresponsive general users
and influencers—there were significant increases after first IRA contact in mean tweet count, and
the number of mentions of @realDonaldTrump and @HillaryClinton. There was also a significant
increase in negative sentiment for influencers as well as responsive general users. Another key
finding was that responsive users who engaged with the IRA generally showed change that was
either higher in percentage or satisfied stricter statistical significance comparedwith non-responsive
users across a variety of different metrics.
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